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Abstract
The paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an
economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the
consumption of taxed goods. It considers three types of policy instruments: the indirect taxes, the
uniform poll transfer and public abatement. This extends the framework set up by Ahmad and Stern
(1984), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Schöb (1996). The theoretical model is illustrated for a
specific externality, namely congestion caused by peak car transport.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, it has been argued that a shift in taxes towards externalities and away from
labour can be justified given the greening of preferences. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) have studied analytically the effects of marginal shifts between
labour taxes and externality taxes. These insights have been illustrated numerically using AGE-models
by Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and others. However, these contributions fail to include income
distribution concerns in their models while this is an important element of the policy problem. First of
all, new environmental taxes will be accepted more easily if they constitute an improvement for most
agents. This will depend on their respective shares in the consumption of dirty goods, their share in the
consumption of goods for which taxes are decreased and finally of their relative valuation of the
improved environmental quality. Secondly, the income distribution dimension is at the heart of the
existing distortionary tax structure. Indeed, in models with identical individuals the optimal tax
structure consists of a head tax combined with a Pigouvian tax. Consequently, determining the
direction of marginal tax reform becomes trivial.
This paper wants to bridge this gap and studies the marginal green tax reform question for an
economy with nonidentical individuals. In addition, two other extensions are made. These consist of
the introduction of externalities that are nonseparable from the consumption of private goods and of the
introduction of a poll tax and public abatement as extra policy instruments. The model used is an
extension of the Ahmad and Stern (1984) model, widely used for the study of the equity-efficiency
trade-off in an economy without externalities. Schöb (1996) has extended this model to include
environmental quality. He concentrates on the separable case and does not focus on income distribution
issues.    
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the model. We assume
throughout our analysis that the simplifying assumptions of the Ahmad and Stern framework (a
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hold . Section 3 discusses a methodology for evaluating revenue neutral marginal tax reforms. It is
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shown how the total welfare cost of a marginal tax change can be decomposed into a direct welfare
cost and an externality impact and that distributional considerations play an important role in both
components. Next, we make the link with the double dividend literature and extend the analysis to
policy reforms involving a change in public abatement investments. The paper ends with a numerical
illustration of the theory to the congestion externality caused by road passenger transport (section 4).
Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. The Model
We consider a single period model for a closed economy. There are I nonidentical consumers
(indexed i=1, . . . ,I) who differ in their preferences and their earning capacity e. There are M goods
i
(indexed m=1, . . . ,M).  Goods 1 to K are normal consumption goods. Goods K+1 to M are goods
whose consumption leads to the externality Z. The consumption vector of consumer i is x =(x , . . . HH 1
ii
,x ), where x  denotes his consumption of good m (x  > 0). Leisure (l ) is the numeraire good and HM Hm Hm H
ii i i
is taken to be untaxed. With T denoting total time available and P the uniform poll transfer, each
consumer faces the following budget constraint:
In this expression q  represents the consumer price of good m. It is the sum of the producer price p Hm m
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The utility function U is strictly quasi-concave in x  and twice continuously differentiable. The
ii
Hm
externality Z is an external diseconomy (0U/0Z < 0). It is assumed that Z enters preferences in a non-
i
separable way. The individual consumer chooses his consumption bundle x  and his consumption of H
i
leisure l  such that his utility is maximized subject to his budget constraint. We assume that when H
i
doing this he ignores his own impact on the externality: he considers himself to be small compared to
the economy. We assume that differentiable demand functions exist and that they are of the form:
Demand is a function of the consumer prices, the poll transfer and the level of the externality. The
externality is thus characterized by a feedback effect: its level affects the demand for the different
commodities and for leisure. A typical example is road congestion: an increase in congestion can
induce a substitution to public transport. Other examples are noise and drinking water quality where
the consumers may engage in defensive expenditures to lower the negative effects of the externality.
Aggregate consumption of good m is denoted by X . The maximum utility individual i can achieve Hm




The level of the externality is determined by the total use of the externality-generating goods
K+1 to M. Each externality-generating good m may have a different contribution to Z. The government
can reduce the level of the externality by undertaking investments in public abatement (R). The
externality is thus given by: M
M
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The production side of the economy is modeled in a simple way. We suppose that the
externality has no impact on production. Nor does the production sector contribute to the externality.
We assume that producer prices are fixed and that there are constant returns to scale so that increases in
taxes are reflected as consumer price increases and that there are no pure profits.
The government provides a level of public abatement (R) at a unit cost of p . It collects taxes R
from the individuals and distributes uniform poll transfers. The government requires resources (B) and
thus public revenue for a number of exogenous activities which are kept constant throughout the
analysis. It faces the following budget constraint:
It can be shown that all allocations that are derived from indirect utility functions and that satisfy the
government budget constraint (6), will satisfy the production possibilities constraints (Walras law
combined with fixed producer prices).
The government maximizes social welfare W which is represented by a Bergson-Samuelson type of
social welfare function.
3. Evaluating a Tax Reform in the Presence of Externalities
The government can make use of three policy instruments: indirect taxes t , the poll transfer Hm
P and the level of public abatement R. Our aim is to offer a methodology for evaluating marginal
policy reforms in the presence of externalities when distributional considerations are taken into
account. We build upon the analysis of Guesnerie (1977), Ahmad and Stern (1984), Schöb (1996) and





















welfare improving or not when starting from an arbitrary tax system and from an arbitrary level of
public abatement. In a first instance the analysis concentrates on marginal reforms of the tax system.
Later, we show how the methodology can be transposed to the evaluation of policy reforms involving
investments in public abatement. 
3.1. The Welfare Cost of a Marginal Tax Change
The question is: how does welfare change if we increase the tax on a good m by an amount
sufficient to raise one unit of government revenue while at the same time we reduce the tax on another
good k (kgm) by an amount sufficient to lose one unit of public revenue. The  effect on welfare of such
a tax change is given by:
where
Defining the marginal cost in terms of social welfare of raising one additional unit of government

































So welfare is increased (reduced) when the tax with the highest marginal welfare cost per additional
unit of government revenue is reduced (increased) and when simultaneously the tax with the lowest
marginal welfare cost per additional unit of government revenue is raised (reduced).
  A similar analysis can be applied to a marginal tax reform involving the poll transfer. In this
case it can be shown that a revenue neutral marginal tax reform which consists of increasing the tax on
good m and recycling the revenue through the poll transfer has a positive, neutral or negative impact on
welfare if and only if
with
In (10) and (13) MCF  and MCF  are defined as a ratio of two components. In the case of MCF  the mP m
numerator consists of the effect on social welfare of a marginal change in the tax on good m
(m=1,...,M). Starting from (7) this is given by:
Expression (14) can be transformed by using Roy's identity and defining the direct social marginal
utility of income accruing to individual i as 
where ￿ is the private marginal utility of income. Moreover, we define the individual marginal
i










































This allows us to rewrite the expression for 0W/0t : Hm
The first term corresponds to what is found in the literature on marginal tax reform in the absence of
externalities. The second term gives the evaluation, in terms of social welfare, of the change in the
externality brought about by the marginal tax change. It is important to see that this term should be
taken into account not only when evaluating a change in an externality tax, but also when looking at
changes in other taxes as long as those other taxes affect the demand for the externality generating
goods. The term 0Z/0t  stands for the full effect of a marginal tax change on the externality. It is Hm
obtained from (5) using demand functions (4):
In this expression ! stands for the externality feedback parameter. It is defined as:
The full effect of a change in taxation on the externality level is thus obtained by multiplying the first
round effect by the externality feedback parameter !. For externalities which enter preferences in a
separable way, the externality feedback parameter reduces to unity.  
The denominator of (10) equals the effect on government revenue of a marginal change in the
tax on good m. It can be written as:0B
0tHm












































Here we take into account that a change in the level of the externality may have an impact on
government revenue. This term is known as the "Pigou-effect" in the literature on the optimal provision
of public goods [Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)]. So if the tax change causes a change in the externality
which leads to an increase in the consumption of taxed commodities, then expression (10) and (20) tell
us that, ceteris paribus, the MCF  will be lower and thus it is more attractive to increase the tax on m
good m. 
Using equations (17) and (20) the marginal welfare cost of raising one additional unit of
government revenue via the tax on good m can be written as:
Expression (21) contains the results of Ahmad and Stern (1984) and Schöb (1996) as special cases. If
there are no externalities, the last term of both the numerator and the denominator drops out and
expression (21) reduces to the familiar expression of Ahmad and Stern (1984). If, on the contrary, there
are externalities in the economy but they are not characterized by a feedback effect, the last term in the
denominator drops out and the externality feedback parameter in the expression for 0Z/0t  equals Hm
unity. In that case we get an expression similar to that of Schöb (1996). However, our analysis still
differs from that of Schöb because we consider an economy with nonidentical individuals whereas he
focuses mainly on identical individuals. 
In an analogous way we find that the marginal welfare cost of raising one additional unit of
















































3.2. The Direct Welfare Cost and the Externality Impact of a Marginal Tax Change
As in Schöb (1996) the MCF  and MCF  can be split into two components. First, we consider mP
the marginal welfare cost of a change in the indirect tax on good m (m=1, . . . ,M). The first component
of the MCF  is called the direct welfare cost of a marginal change in the tax on good m and is defined m
as:
The second component of the MCF  is the marginal externality impact of a change in t  which is m Hm
defined as
In contrast to Schöb (1996) both cost components contain income distribution weights and the
feedback effect of the externality on the consumption of taxed goods. 
The marginal cost in terms of social welfare of one additional unit of government revenue
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 In analogy with Schöb (1996) we can introduce the concept of the critical value of the
2
marginal social willingness to pay for a reduction in Z. It shows the value that the social marginal
willingness to pay for a lower Z should take before a policy becomes attractive. It may be a useful
concept if the direct welfare effect and the externality impact of the marginal tax reform do not suggest
the same direction of tax reform. For the particular tax reform we have considered here, it is defined as:
In this expression MZ  stands for the change in the externality brought about by increasing the tax on m




Based on (11) and using (25) we see that for an increase in the tax on good m accompanied by a
decrease in the tax on good k
The left hand side of the second expression presents the direct welfare cost of the revenue neutral tax
reform. The right-hand side gives the externality cost of the tax reform . It has a positive value if the
2
tax reform causes a net reduction in the level of the externality. Suppose the increase in the tax on good
m reduces the externality. Then from the definition of MEI  and 0Z/0t  we know that the overall mH m
effect on the externality of increasing t  and decreasing t  will certainly be negative (i.e. the Hm Hk
externality is reduced) if all the externality generating goods are substitutes for or neutral with respect
to good k. But if some of the externality generating goods are substitutes for good k while others are
complements, the tax reform will only lead to a net reduction in the externality level if the following
condition is satisfied:
This condition is derived from the definition of the marginal externality impact of a tax change










































externality if the ratio of the full effect on Z of the marginal tax change for good k to that of the
marginal tax change for good m is larger than the ratio of the associated marginal revenue changes. 
Up to now we have only considered policy reforms involving indirect taxes. However, in an
analogous way, we can define the the marginal direct welfare cost of a change in the uniform poll
transfer P (MCF ) and the marginal externality impact of a change in P (MEI ) as follows: p P
d
The sum of these two components equals the MCF . P
Finally, from (12) we find
3.3. The Importance of Distributional Considerations
An important dimension of our analysis is that we consider an economy with nonidentical
individuals. Distributional considerations are present in both components of MCF  and MCF . For mP
MCF  this can be made clear when we rewrite expressions (23) and (24). Following Ahmad and Stern m






























where el  denotes the elasticity of government revenue with respect to the tax on good m  and r Bm m
stands for the distributional characteristic of good m. It is defined as [Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)]. 
The distributional characteristic has a high value if good m is consumed proportionally more by people
with a high social welfare weight. A higher value of the distributional characteristic implies that,
ceteris paribus, the MCF  will be higher and that therefore, it is less attractive to increase the tax on m
good m.
The second component of MCF , namely MEI , can be rewritten in a similar way. We define mm
r  as the distributional characteristic of the externality Z Z
r  has a higher value if a decrease in the externality is valued proportionally more by people with a high Z
marginal social welfare weight. Moreover, we define el  as the elasticity of the externality with respect Zm
to the tax on good m. This gives us
A higher (lower) value of the distributional characteristic of the externality makes it more attractive to
increase (decrease) the tax on good m in as far as this tax is effective in reducing the externality (large
and negative el ).   Zm
Since distributional considerations are present in both terms of MCF , their impact will be m
determined by the confrontation of the two. If increasing the tax on good m reduces the externality,










increase (decrease) the tax on good m. In this case the two components of MCF  reinforce each other m
and suggest the same welfare improving direction of tax reform. An example can be found in the field
of energy taxes. Energy use leads to the emission of CO  which is one of the greenhouse gases. Energy 2
is consumed proportionally more by poor people while these people give a relatively lower value to
CO  reduction than rich people. If the government has a high degree of inequality aversion, an increase 2
in the tax on energy is less likely given the distributional considerations (everything else being equal).
However, if r  and r  are both high or low, there is a trade-off between the distributional considerations mZ
of the two components of MCF  and one cannot predict beforehand which one will dominate. Such a m
trade-off is likely to occur in the case of congestion caused by road transport. We assume that
increasing the tax on road transport reduces congestion. Road transport is consumed proportionally less
by poor people (low value of the distributional characteristic of road transport) while these people
value a reduction in congestion relatively less than rich people (low value of r ). Whatever the Z
inequality aversion of the government, in this case one cannot state beforehand that distributional
considerations point out a particular welfare improving direction of tax reform.
As can be expected, in the case of a marginal tax reform involving the poll transfer,
distributional considerations are also present. From (29) and using (34) we know that 
In this expression el  stands for the elasticity of net tax revenue and el  for the elasticity of the BP ZP
externality w.r.t. the poll transfer. It is clear that if an increase in the poll transfer increases the
externality and el <0, a higher distributional characteristic of Z implies, everything else equal, a lower BP



















3.4. The Link with the Double Dividend Literature
The link can be made with the double dividend literature [see e.g.,  Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Goulder (1995)]. The double dividend literature analyzes
revenue neutral environmental tax reforms which consist of increasing the tax on the externality
generating good and of recycling the revenue obtained this way either by increasing the lump sum
transfer or by reducing existing distortionary taxes. The welfare effects of such tax reforms are split
into two categories. The first category is termed the first dividend and is related to the net reduction in
the negative externality brought about by the tax reform. The second category of welfare effects
consists essentially of the increase or decrease of gross welfare (i.e. without taking into account the
welfare impact of the change in the externality). A similar analysis can be carried out by using our
model. However, compared to the double dividend literature our model is more general because we
consider externalities that affect the consumption of taxed goods and because we incorporate
distributional considerations. 
Suppose that t  is a tax on an externality generating good (m=K+1,...,M) while t  is a tax on Hm Hk
any of goods 1 to K which do not contribute to the externality. We also assume that the revenue neutral
tax reform which consists of increasing t  and reducing t  causes a net reduction in the level of the Hm Hk
externality. In our model this corresponds with MEI  - MEI  > 0. In terms of the double dividend km
literature a first dividend is realized. In order to check whether a second dividend is realized, it is
necessary to compute the so-called gross marginal welfare cost of each instrument. This corresponds
with the marginal welfare cost for a constant level of the externality and is denoted by MCF . For a
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A similar expression can be found for MCF . The gross marginal welfare cost (MCF ) differs from the P
**
direct marginal welfare cost (MCF ) because the latter cost category takes into account the impact of
d
the change in the externality on government revenue. 
A weak double dividend is now said to be realized if in terms of our model
This means that there is a smaller (higher) gross welfare cost (gain) if the public revenue raised by a
marginal increase in the externality tax, is recycled by reducing a distortionary tax than if instead it is
recycled by increasing the poll transfer. Alternatively, one can also say that a weak double dividend is
present if
Whether this is the case or not, depends to a large extent on distributional considerations. E.g., if the
inequality aversion is low and if rich people consume proportionally more of good k a weak double
dividend is more likely to occur. 
A strong double dividend is said to be present if the use of the externality tax revenue for the
reduction of existing distortionary taxes compensates fully the "gross distortionary costs" of the
externality tax. So if the marginal tax reform leads to a net gross welfare gain (i.e., MCF  - MCF  < mk
**
0), we can say that a strong double dividend is realized. Here also distributional considerations are
important. A strong double dividend is present if the marginal tax reform analysis for a constant level
of the externality shows that it is welfare improving to reduce t  and to increase t . In other words, a Hk Hm
strong double dividend will result if it is welfare improving to carry out the proposed tax reform even if
























3.5. Applying the Methodology for the Evaluation of Marginal Tax Reforms to the Analysis of
Investments in Public Abatement
In the previous sections we have focused our attention on marginal reforms of the tax system.
However, apart from tax instruments, the government can also use another instrument: it can change
the level of investment in public abatement. We can apply a similar methodology as before to
determine whether a change in public abatement is welfare improving or not. We concentrate on the
following problem: what is the effect on welfare if public abatement is increased by an amount
sufficient to lose one unit of government revenue, while at the same time the tax on good m 
(m=1, . . . ,M) is increased such that one unit of public revenue is raised? In a similar way as before, we
can derive that
Since in our model public abatement is only valued by people in so far as it reduces the level of the
externality, there is no direct welfare gain associated with a marginal increase in public abatement. As
a result, the total welfare cost of a marginal change in public abatement equals the marginal externality
impact of that change, or:
where When there are no other sources of income, we can use the homogeneity of degree zero
3
property so that the taxes on labour can be translated into equal increases of the taxes on all goods
other than leisure.
 We start from (21). Both the numerator and the denominator are multiplied by q . The last
4
Hm
term of the numerator and the denominator is multiplied and divided by Z. The last two terms of the
denominator are multiplied and divided by q  and X . Using the following definitions: Hk Hk
el  = (0Z/0t ) q /Z, el | =  ( 0X /0t )|  t /X  and el  = 0X /0Z Z/X , we obtain (43). Zm Hm Hm km Z Hk Hm Z Hm Hk kZ Hk Hk
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4. A Numerical Illustration of the Theoretical Model - The Congestion Externality Caused by
Road Passenger Transport
In this section we present a simple illustration of the methodology developed in the previous
sections. The illustration starts from the Belgian tax system in 1986. It focuses on one specific
externality, namely congestion caused by car passenger transport during the peak period. We make the
simplifying assumption that road congestion is caused only by passenger transport and that it has no
effect on freight transport. This assumption is more realistic in an urban setting than for interregional
transport. If the assumption cannot be held, the producer prices can no longer be assumed to be fixed
and a different approach should be used for the evaluation of marginal policy reforms [see e.g., Van de
gaer et al. (1992)]. 
In our application there are 5 consumer groups which differ in their earning capacity. They 
correspond with the quintiles of the 1986-87 budget survey. There are four goods and one factor. Good
1 is a composite non-transport consumption good, good 2 is peak car transport use which generates
congestion, good 3 is off-peak car transport use and good 4 is public transport use. The last two
passenger transport modes are assumed not to cause any congestion. Labour is given as total time
available (T) minus leisure. It is taken as untaxed numeraire . Each consumer receives a uniform poll
3
transfer. The congestion externality is a positive function of the total use of peak car transport and a
negative function of the level of road capacity (R). 
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el  stands for the aggregate elasticity of the externality with respect to the price of good m. The Zm
aggregate uncompensated elasticity of the demand for good k with respect to the price of good m for a
given level of the externality is given by el | . Finally, el  refers to the aggregate elasticity of demand km Z kZ
for good k with respect to the externality. Similar expressions can be derived for marginal policy
reforms involving the poll transfer and the level of public abatement.
el |  is the elasticity of the demand for good k with respect to the poll transfer (for constant Z). el  and kP Z ZP
el  stand for the elasticity of the externality with respect to the poll transfer and the road capacity ZR
respectively. 
The implementation of (43)-(45) requires four categories of information. The data are
summarized in Tables 1 to 5. For a description of the data sources we refer to the Appendix. The first
three categories of information correspond with those needed in a marginal tax reform analysis without
externalities [see e.g. Decoster and Schokkaert (1989)]. They consist of information on (i) economic
variables, (ii) welfare weights and (iii) the aggregate income and uncompensated price elasticities of
the demand for the taxed commodities. The economic variables include the tax rates (t /q ), the poll Hm Hm- 20 -
transfer (P), the spending on taxed commodities of the different consumer groups (qx), aggregate Hm Hm
i
spending on these goods (qX), and total public spending on road capacity (p R ). The incorporation Hm Hm R
of transport externalities requires additional information which is grouped in the fourth information
category. This category consists first of all of information on the level of congestion (Z). In addition,
one needs to know the aggregate elasticity of the externality with respect to the price of each taxed
good (el ), w.r.t. the poll transfer (el ) and the level of road infrastructure (el ). One also needs the Zm ZP ZR
aggregate elasticity of demand for each taxed good n with respect to the externality. Finally, one needs
information on the individualized value of a decrease in the externality. Summarizing, it can be
concluded that the data requirements for analyzing marginal tax reforms in the presence of externalities
are much more stringent because individual valuation data on the decrease in the externality are now
required. 
Table 1: The Government Instruments
Tax rates Observed tax rates Normalized tax rates
(% of producer price) (% of consumer price)
a
   Labour 40.49% 0.00%
   Composite commodity 11.89% 46.82%
   Peak car transport 43.20% 58.45%
   Off peak car transport 43.20% 58.45%
   Public Transport -69.53% -95.30%
Public spending Observed Normalized
(% of total tax income) (% of total tax income)
   Poll transfer 47.71% 60.53%
   Road infrastructure 2.85% 2.15%
 The tax rates and the poll transfer are normalized such that labour is the untaxed good
a- 21 -
Table 2: Information on the Quintiles
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Total
12345
Spending (% of total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
spending by quintile)
  Composite commodity 90.59% 89.58% 89.01% 89.18% 90.23% 89.72%
  Peak car transport 3.66% 4.11% 4.91% 4.82% 4.52% 4.53%
  Off peak car transport 5.13% 5.75% 5.54% 5.46% 4.87% 5.26%
  Public transport 0.62% 0.56% 0.54% 0.55% 0.39% 0.49%
Valuation of reduction 1 1.12 1.55 1.55 2.02
in the externality
(quintile 1 = 1)
Table 3: Welfare Weights
Degree of inequality aversion
J = 0 J = 1 J = 5 J = 10
￿ 1111
1
￿ 1 0.87 0.50 0.25
2
￿ 1 0.78 0.29 0.09
3
￿ 1 0.66 0.12 0.02
4
￿ 1 0.44 0.02 0.00
5
Table 4: Demand Elasticities
Prices Income Externality
Leisure Comp. Peak car Off peak Public tp
comm. tp car tp
Leisure -0.23 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.99 -0.01
Comp. comm. 1.03 -1.16 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Peak car tp 0.14 -0.15 -0.20 0.05 0.01 1.10 -0.25
Off peak car tp 0.56 -0.15 0.04 -0.60 -0.02 1.20 0.05
Public tp 0.47 0.10 0.12 -0.18 -0.50 0.00 0.27- 22 -
Table 5: The Elasticity of the Externality with respect to its Determinants
Elasticity of the externality w.r.t.
Price composite commodity -0.11
Price peak car transport -0.14
Price off-peak car transport 0.04
Price public transport 0.01
Poll transfer (increase) 0.11
Road infrastructure capacity (increase) -0.69
Using the information summarized in Tables 1 to 5, we can calculate the total marginal welfare
costs (i.e., the sum of the direct marginal welfare cost and the marginal externality impact) of the
different government instruments when taking into account the presence of the congestion externality.
The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The marginal tax reform exercise has been repeated for
different degrees of inequality aversion to test the sensitivity of the results to this parameter. A value of
J = 0 means that the social welfare function gives an equal weight to all income groups. As the value of
J increases, society has a higher degree of inequality aversion. 
The first part of Table 6 gives the total marginal welfare cost of the different policy
instruments. To get a better overview, the second part of Table 6 presents the ranking of the policy
instruments in terms of their marginal welfare cost. For the pure efficiency social welfare function 
(J = 0) it is welfare improving to increase capacity, to increase the tax on public transport and on peak
car transport and to decrease the poll transfer, the tax on the composite commodity and the tax on off-
peak car transport. A first important empirical result is that the policy recommendations do depend on
the degree of inequality aversion. As society becomes more inequality averse the overall ranking is
changed. First of all, there is a reversal in the ranking of the tax on peak car transport and that on
public transport. With a higher degree of inequality aversion a higher tax on public transport becomes a
more costly instrument to raise government revenue compared to the tax on peak car transport.
Secondly, as society becomes more averse to inequality, financing an increase in government revenue
by lowering the poll transfer becomes less attractive.- 23 -
Table 6: The Total Marginal Welfare Costs (MCF) of the Different Government Instruments
Degree of inequality aversion
J = 0 J = 1 J = 5 J = 10
MCF
  Indirect tax on comp. comm. t 2.22 1.45 0.52 0.30
  Indirect tax on peak car tp t 1.01 0.65 0.22 0.12
  Indirect tax on off peak car tp t 1.56 1.03 0.37 0.21
  Indirect tax on public tp t 0.85 0.58 0.23 0.13
  Poll transfer (decrease) P 1.28 0.96 0.50 0.35
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Table 7 gives more information on the composition of the total marginal welfare costs. It
shows that the ranking for the tax instruments and the poll transfer in terms of their MCF is determined
mainly by the direct marginal welfare costs (MCF ). This is the second important empirical result.
d
However, the marginal externality impact does explain why the ranking between the tax on peak car
transport and that on public transport is reversed for larger values of J. Moreover, the inclusion of the
marginal externality impact significantly changes the policy conclusions regarding the road capacity.
While on the basis of the direct welfare costs it is optimal to raise revenue by reducing the road
capacity level and to recycle this revenue through a decrease in other taxes or an increase in the poll
transfer, this is no longer the case if the marginal externality impact of the capacity instrument is taken
into account. Indeed, if one incorporates the impact on congestion into the analysis, it becomes optimal It should be noted that capacity only enters the utility function of the consumers because it
5
determines the level of congestion. The model does not take into account the environmental or
disruptive costs of expanding road capacity. Including these effects would make an increase in road
capacity less attractive than it is now. Depending on the magnitude of the environmental effects and on
the consumers' valuation of them, the ranking of the capacity instrument w.r.t. the other instruments
could in some cases be reversed. 
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to increase the level of road capacity and to finance this increase by increasing another indirect tax or
by decreasing the poll transfer . 
5
Table 7: The Components of the Total Marginal Welfare Cost
Degree of inequality aversion
J = 0 J = 1 J = 5 J = 10
Indirect tax on comp. comm.
   MCF 2.23 1.45 0.52 0.30
d
   MEI -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Indirect tax on peak car tp
   MCF 1.15 0.74 0.25 0.133
d
   MEI -0.14 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01
Indirect tax on off peak car tp
   MCF 1.52 1.00 0.36 0.20
d
   MEI 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00
Indirect tax on public tp
   MCF 0.81 0.55 0.22 0.129
d
   MEI 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00
Poll transfer (decrease)
   MCF 1.30 0.98 0.50 0.35
d
   MEI -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Road capacity (decrease)
   MCF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d
   MEI 4.74 2.95 0.90 0.46
In order to assess the possibility of realizing a double dividend, we need to know the marginal
welfare cost of the different instruments obtained for a constant level of the externality. Table 8
presents the value of the MCF  for different degrees of inequality aversion and the ranking of the
*
instruments from low to high MCF . The ranking in terms of MCF  corresponds completely with that
**
in terms of MCF , though the value of the two measures is different. This is because, in the presence of
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a nonseparable externality, MCF  takes into account the impact of a change in the externality on
d
government revenue. We consider marginal policy reforms which consist of an increase in the tax on
peak car transport and several alternative ways of recycling the extra revenue it generates. Table 8
shows that for low degrees of inequality aversion (J = 0 and J = 1) the gross welfare gain that can be
obtained by returning the externality tax revenue through lower distortionary taxes (t  or t ) is higher H1 H3
than when it is redistributed through a higher poll transfer. This means that in these cases a weak
double dividend can be realised. For J = 5 this is the case only when the tax on the composite
commodity (t ) is lowered. But since this is the most representative distortionary tax, this is still a H1
positive result. However, for very high degrees of inequality aversion (J = 10) there is no more
possibility for a weak double dividend. 
Table 8: The Total Marginal Welfare Costs (MCF ) of the Different Government
*
Instruments for a Constant Level of the Externality
Degree of inequality aversion
J = 0 J = 1 J = 5 J = 10
MCF
*
  Indirect tax on comp. comm. t 2.24 1.45 0.52 0.30
  Indirect tax on peak car tp t 1.18 0.76 0.25 0.14
  Indirect tax on off peak car tp t 1.51 1.00 0.36 0.20
  Indirect tax on public tp t 0.80 0.55 0.22 0.13
  Poll transfer (decrease) P 1.31 0.98 0.51 0.35










  PPt t
  ttP t


















Weak double dividend test:
is MCF  > MCF  ? yes yes yes no tH1 P
**
Strong double dividend test
is MCF  < MCF  ? yes yes yes yes tH2 tH1
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From Table 8 it is also clear that for all values of J a strong double dividend can be realized:
the revenue neutral substitution of the tax on peak car transport for a representative or typical
distortionary tax (such as the tax on the composite commodity) leads to a gross welfare gain. Indeed,
the MCF  of t  is always smaller than that of t . This can also be observed for the less representative
*
H2 H1
tax on off peak car transport. So, even without considering the externality effects, these policy reforms
are welfare improving. All other policy reforms are characterized by a trade-off between the impact on
direct welfare and that on the externality.
5. Conclusions
The paper contributes in three ways to the existing theory on marginal tax reform in the
presence of externalities. The analysis looks at a general type of externalities, namely those which have
a feedback on private consumption. It is shown that for a correct evaluation of marginal tax reforms
one should not only take into account the impact of the tax reform on the externality level but also the
possibility that a change in the level of the externality may have an impact on the consumption of taxed
commodities. Secondly, the importance of distributional considerations is demonstrated. These should
be considered when analyzing both the direct welfare costs and the externality impact of a marginal tax
change. Thirdly, it is shown that the analysis of tax reforms may be extended to the analysis of
marginal changes in other policy instruments, such as public abatement, which have an effect on the
government budget balance. The theoretical model is illustrated for a specific externality, namely
congestion caused by peak car transport. It is shown that the data requirements for carrying out the
analysis in that context are more difficult than for the traditional marginal tax reform analysis. The
present approach can be extended in several ways. The model could incorporate externalities in the
production sector (freight transport) and one could use more elaborated representations of travel
behaviour and congestion phenomena.- 27 -
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Appendix: Description of the Data Sources for the Marginal Tax Reform Illustration
a.. The tax rates and the poll transfer
The data for the tax rates and the level of the poll transfer are found in Van Dongen et al.
(1993), OECD (1992), Evrard (1993a,1993b) and Vanneste (1992). They normalized tax rates are
calculated such that labour is the untaxed good. The underlying marginal tax rate on labour is 40.50%.
b. Spending on the taxed commodities
In the household budget survey of 1986-87 information is found on the spending on taxed
commodities of the different consumer groups (q x) and aggregate spending on these goods (q Hm Hm Hm
i
X ). However, no distinction is made between peak and off-peak car transport use. For this we have as Hm
a first approximation extrapolated findings for Brussels [Stratec (1992)] to the rest of Belgium.
c. Total public spending on road capacity
Due to a lack of suitable data, we have approximated total spending in Belgium on road
capacity by using information for the Netherlands. van der Bij et al. (1994) have found a value of
57.7% for the ratio of spending on car passenger transport infrastructure to taxes collected from
passenger transport. This ratio has been applied in our exercise.
d. The welfare weights
The welfare weights are constructed using a similar procedure as in Decoster and Schokkaert
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y  is defined as the total expenditure per adult equivalent in consumer class i. It is approximated by the E
i
total expenditure per capita. 
e. The congestion function
The congestion function is based on work by Kirwan et al. (1995). They have found that for a
city the overall relation between the time needed for a km of travel and the total number of vehicle km
can be described as
X  is the number of vehicle km driven in the 4-hour peak period. In De Borger et al. (1997) a similar H2
relationship has been used for interregional transport. From the confrontation of total spending on the
use of private transport [Belgium, N.I.S. (1992)] with the total number of vehicle km per year [based
on FEBIAC (1987) and De Borger (1987)] we have derived an average price per km which is applied
to the data of the budget survey to find the corresponding no. of vehicle km in the peak and off-peak
period. The congestion function is calibrated such that at the initial peak car transport level average
speed is 60 km/h, freeflow speed is 85 km/h and speed decreases to 50 km/h at traffic levels 20%
higher than the initial peak car traffic level.
  
e. The valuation of a reduction in the externality
The value of a marginal decrease in the congestion externality is based on a study carried out
for the Netherlands by Hague Consulting Group (1990). That study has derived values for a marginal
time saving in transport activities for different income groups. - 32 -
f. Elasticities
Several types of elasticities have to be discerned. First of all we need aggregate income and
uncompensated price elasticities of the demand for the different taxed commodities. For the transport
goods these are based on the transport literature ['t Hoen et al. (1991), De Borger et al. (1996), Peirson
et al. (1994), Dodgson and Topham (1987)]. The other elasticities are derived such all properties of
Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions are satisfied [Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)]. The
average own price elasticity of the labour supply is 0.35, a value which is close to the one found in
Hansson & Stuart (1985).DISCUSSION PAPERS 1997
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